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THE BEST OF BOTH "OPEN" AND "CLOSED"
ADOPTION WORLDS: A CALL FOR THE

REFORM OF STATE STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
Critics have accused the American adoption process' of assigning economic roles to participants: biological parents as manufacturers, adoptive
parents as customers and babies as merchandise.2 This macroeconomic parallel illustrates the effect of supply and demand on adoption. As the number
of mothers opting for adoption has declined in recent years, requests for
healthy infants have outstripped supply.3 Like any commodity of which the
government wishes to encourage production, states 4 need to offer incentives
if they want "manufacturers"-unwed mothers-to place their "merchandise" on the market.
States have a strong interest in encouraging unwed mothers to offer babies for adoption. Such adoptions simultaneously combat the social
problems of illegitimacy and childlessness. 5 States historically have ignored
the needs and wants of unwed mothers, however, and have structured adop1.

The National Committee for Adoption, the nation's largest organization exclusively devoted to
adoption, defines adoption as
a legal procedure in which a person or couple takes a child that is not their offspring...
and raises the child as their own; this child may be unrelated to either adoptive parent, may
be the child of one member of the couple, or may be related in some other way to the
adoptive parents. Adoption severs all legal ties between the adoptee and his or her birth
parents except when one birth parent is a member of the adopting couple, and establishes
such ties between the adoptee and the adoptive parents. Legally, the adoptee has the same
status with respect to his or her adoptive parents as do any nonadopted siblings.
NATIONAL COMMIITEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK: UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES,
REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 10 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ADOPTION FACTBOOK].

2.

3.

See L. McTAGGART, THE BABY BROKERS 339 (1980). Adoption also has been analyzed as a
problem of supply and demand:
Where adopters are well-served, in the sense that they can choose the child of their dreams
and adopt it without too much fuss, there is sure to be a large supply of unwanted children,
most of whom will never be adopted. Where the children are well-served, with a large
enough supply of possible parents so that the right ones can be selected for each child, there
are bound to be many disappointed would-be adopters.
M. BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 215 (1976).
In the United States in 1982, 50,720 healthy infants were available for adoption by parents with no
blood relation to the child. In addition, 91,141 children were adopted by couples in which one
parent was related by blood to the child. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 13. Many
adoptions between relatives occur when a child's parent remarries and the parent's new spouse
legally adopts the child. See A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE:
THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS AND ADOPTIVE PAR-

ENTS 47 (1978). Meanwhile, in 1984 two million U.S. couples waited to adopt children, preferably
healthy, white infants. See Leepson, Issues in Child Adoption, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 859

4.
5.

(1984).
State law and state courts control adoption in the United States. Federal laws preempt state laws
concerning adoption of American Indian children. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982). The adoption of
foreign children is controlled by U.S. immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 110(b)(1)(F) (1982).
See A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 47. But see Bean, Introduction:Adoption--Some Reflections and Considerations,in ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL POLICY, LAW, AND
SOCIOLOGY 1, 9-10 (P. Bean ed. 1984) (although adoption policies traditionally have attempted to
meet the needs of the childless, adoption never has been a solution for most childless couples,
primarily because there never have been enough babies).
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tion to serve the adoptive parents.6 While liberalization of state abortion
laws has decreased the number of potential adoptees,7 studies' show that
the increasing tendency of unwed mothers to raise their children might play
a greater role in the decline.9 As society increasingly accepts unwed
parenthood,'" single mothers keep more babies. " Meanwhile, adoption
waiting lists grow longer. 12
Different circumstances surround every pregnancy. The values and ethics of some unwed mothers allow them to opt for abortion. But many who
find abortion unacceptable wrestle with whether to keep their babies or offer
6.

A major by-product of this emphasis has been the sealing of adoption records and the issuance of

new birth certificates for adoptees, a practice common in the United States since the 1930s. See W.
FEIGELMAN & A. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW PATrERNS OF ADOPTIVE RELATION-

7.

SHIPS 193 (1983). Supporters argue that closed adoption records benefit all parties in the adoption
triangle: adoptive parents, adoptees and birth parents. Sealed records have been thought to offer
adoptive parents privacy and family unity, adoptees a better attachment to their new parents and
biological parents anonymity. Id. at 194. See also Comment, The Arizona Adoption Records Statute: A Callfor Reform, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 473 (to preserve the adoption process, adoptive
parents must have assurance that the birth status of the adoptee will not be revealed).
The number of abortions in the United States increased from 744,600 in 1973 to 1,573,900 in 1982.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

THE UNITED STATES: 1985, at 67 (105th ed. 1984).
The United States Supreme Court granted broad protection for the right to have an abortion in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment limits state power to regulate abortion through criminal statutes. During the first trimester, the woman's right to privacy includes a right to terminate pregnancy that the state cannot
override. During the second trimester, the state has a compelling interest in promoting the health
of the mother, and the state may reasonably regulate abortion procedures to protect maternal
health. After the fetus reaches viability, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the potential human life. At this point, the state may regulate or prohibit abortions, except those medically
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 163-64. The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed the general principles of Roe in Thornburgh v. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 54 U.S.L.W. 4618, 4621 (U.S. June 10, 1986) (No. 84-495).
No U.S. government agency has routinely collected statistics about adoption and related services
since 1975. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 9. Recent data comes from private agencies
interested in adoption policy. The National Committee for Adoption's Adoption Factbook, published in November 1985, is the most ambitious effort made in recent years to collect comprehensive adoption data. Much of the Factbook's data is from 1982. See id. at 5, 13.
See Leynes, Keep or Adopt: A Study of Factors Influencing PregnantAdolescents' Plansfor Their
Babies, 11 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 105 (1980); Musick, Handler & Waddill, Teens and
Adoption: A Pregnancy Resolution Alternative?, CHILDREN TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 24, 26;
Resnick, Studying Adolescent Mothers' Decision Making About Adoption and Parenting, SOC.
WORK, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 5, 7; ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 19.
Although many young women find their parents initially angry about unwed pregnancy, acceptance follows almost invariably. One study found that "within all groups, there are very few familial, peer or community sanctions against keeping a baby." Musick, Handler & Waddill, supra note

9, at 26.
The National Committee for Adoption estimates 715,000 unmarried women gave birth in 1982,
and more than 500,000 of them chose to keep their children. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra
note 1,at 13, 18.
In March 1984, 3,130,000 children under age 18 lived with their never-married mothers. About
381,000 of those never-married mothers were 15 to 19 years old. Another 958,000 were 20 to 24
years old. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REP., SERIES P-20, No.
330, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1984, at 52 (1985).
Many potential adoptive parents face a five- to seven-year wait. See Leepson, supra note 3, at 859;
Bean, supra note 5, at 10. Although adoption waiting time has increased dramatically in recent

years, potential adoptive parents in years past did not face much better prospects:
[For] adopters in Western countries the availability of children has never been sufficient.
While a lot of the literature suggests that traditional adoption policies were directed to
meeting the needs of the childless. . . adoption has never been a solution for the majority
of childless people. Even when non-parental adoptions were at their height in the 1960s
there were more would-be adopters than available children.
Bean, supra note 5, at 10.
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them for adoption. In such cases, the decision whether to offer an infant for
adoption may rest on whether the woman can secure an adoption under
acceptable terms.
This note suggests that states develop flexible adoption statutes that will
accommodate the concerns of unwed mothers. After examining the state
interest in adoption as a resolution for unwed pregnancy, the note examines
the status of adoption laws in the United States. The note concludes that
current laws fail to meet the needs of many unwed mothers because the
statutes do not allow flexibility concerning the degree of confidentiality
under which the adoption is granted. Finally, the note points to areas in
which statutory reform could improve adoption.
THE STATE'S INTEREST
In setting policy, states must decide whether to promote abortion, adoption or single parenthood as the preferred solution' 3 for unwed pregnancy.' 4
Abortion represents the most cost-efficient solution to unplanned pregnancy. t5 It leaves the woman without a dependent child, thus reducing her
potential need for government financial assistance.' 6
The state has interests, however, beyond economics. States are permitted to encourage live birth over abortion by subsidizing childbirth costs,
according to the Supreme Court's decision in Maher v. Roe.' 7 The Court
13.
14.

The state may wish to solve the problem of unplanned pregnancy before conception by offering and
encouraging the use of family planning and contraception. No system of family planning, however,
can eliminate all cases of unplanned pregnancy. This note deals with such pregnancies.
Because unmarried mothers are the most likely to relinquish babies for adoption, this note limits
its discussion to babies born out of wedlock. Births to unmarried teens have quadrupled since 1940.
In 1980, unwed mothers gave birth to almost one-fifth of all babies born in the United States. See
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF TRENDS AND POLICY,

15.

16.

17.

1969-1984, Briefing Papers at 2 (1985).
Costs vary, but in 1981 the cost of a first-trimester clinic abortion averaged $190 in the United
States. The inflation-adjusted cost of abortion decreased 28% between 1975 and 1981. See Henshaw, FreestandingAbortion Clinics: Services, Structure, Fees, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 248, 249-56
(1982).
In contrast, a 1982 survey of costs associated with childbirth showed the average cost of a
hospital stay in the United States was $1,420 for a usual delivery in a birthing room and $1,450 for
a usual delivery with labor and delivery rooms. Professional services for a usual delivery averaged
$642. The average cost of a basic layette, including baby wardrobe and nursery items, was $851.
Maternity wardrobe cost an estimated $235. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FAM.
ECON. REV., July 1984, at 19.
Four basic federal welfare programs are available for families with children: Aid to Families With
Dependent Children, food stamps, Medicaid and subsidized housing. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUMMARY OF POOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF TRENDS AND POLICY, 19681984, at 15 (1985). Many never-married mothers who rely on those benefits still find their families
below the poverty line. See id. at 1, 18-22. At any rate, unwed mothers are hard-pressed to cover
the costs of raising a child. A 1984 government study showed the cost of raising a child from birth
to age 18 in a husband-wife family with no more than five children in an urban area ranged, in
1984 dollars, from $86,845 in the North Central region to $96,484 in the West. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FAM. ECON. REV., April 1985, at 32. Costs for raising rural, nonfarm
children ranged from $80,996 in the North Central region to $100,821 in the West. See id. at 33.
In addition to reducing government aid payments to single parents, abortion also may eliminate some of the burden on government to provide foster care. See D. DAY, THE ADOPTION OF
BLACK CHILDREN 11 (1979) (the availability of abortion and the resulting decrease in the number
of adoptable, healthy, white infants increase the odds that older and harder-to-place children, who
otherwise would require foster care, will be adopted).
432 U.S. 464, 466-68 (1977). In Maher, Connecticut residents eligible for medical assistance under
Connecticut's Medicaid plan and who were denied financial assistance for desired nontherapeutic
abortions, brought an equal protection challenge to state regulations that limited such assistance to
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found childbirth subsidy "a rational means of encouraging childbirth."' 8
Before Maher, all but four states allocated Medicaid funds to pay for elective abortions.1 9 Within 100 days of the Court's decision, a majority of
states discontinued payments for most abortions,2" choosing to promote
childbirth over abortion.
Whether or not states decide to promote live birth as a policy matter,
they still must address the issue of childbirth because an increasing number
of unwed mothers exercise that option.2" About 514,700 of the 686,600 unmarried American women who gave birth in 1981 were under age twentyfive,22 and at least four-fifths of those unwed young mothers kept their
babies.2 3
In great part, the social stigma surrounding young, unwed mothers has
abortions certified as medically necessary by a doctor. Id. at 466-68. Finding abortion and childbirth to be "simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy" within the framework of Roe v. Wade (see supra note 7) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court ruled
the equal protection clause does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program to pay
elective abortion expenses simply because the state has made a policy choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth. 432 U.S. at 479-80.
In the companion case of Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), the Court noted that when Congress passed Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965, nontherapeutic abortions were illegal in
most states. Id. at 447. In view of prevailing state law in 1965, the Court found the plaintiffs did
not prove that Congress intended to require-rather than permit-participating states to fund
nontherapeutic abortions. Id.
18. 432 U.S. at 479. The majority also noted that the state's interest in future state population could, in
some circumstances, "constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position of neutrality
between abortion and childbirth." Id. at 478 n. 11. The Court ruled that states need not prove a
"compelling" interest in childbirth in order to fund childbirth but not abortion "any more than a
State must so justify its election to fund public but not private education." Id. at 477.
In the companion case of Beal v. Doe, the Court noted that Roe v. Wade recognized a strong
state interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. 432 U.S. at 446. While that interest does
not become sufficiently compelling to usurp a woman's privacy right until the third trimester of
pregnancy, the state has "significant" interest in encouraging childbirth throughout the course of
pregnancy. Id.
19. In February 1976, Indiana, Louisiana and Ohio restricted Medicaid coverage to "therapeutic" or
"medically necessary" abortions in all trimesters. In addition, Arizona had no operative Medicaid
program. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Medicaid Pays for Abortion in Most States, 5 FAM.
PLAN./Pop. REP. 11 (1976).
20. The Supreme Court announced its decision in Maher v. Roe on June 20, 1977. 432 U.S. at 464. By
September 25, 30 states had discontinued payment for abortions in most instances. See Alan
Guttmacher Institute, Governors Veto Restrictions on State Funds for Abortion, 6 FAM. PLAN./
Pop. REP. 57, 58-59 (1977).
In fiscal year 1979, 16 states and the District of Columbia provided state funds for all abortions
or for all "medically necessary" abortions. Policy in 24 states mirrored the federal standard (abortions funded by Medicaid only in cases of rape or incest, or when the life or physical health of the
mother was endangered). Nine states allowed the use of state funds for abortions only when the life
of the mother was endangered. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, States Spent $74. 7 Millionfor Family Planning Services Under Medicaid Program in FY 79, 10 FAM. PLAN./PoP. REP. 32, 36-37
(1981).
21. Even after Roe v. Wade, the number of illegitimate births increased. There were 585,600 births to
unmarried women in 1982 and 398,700 such births in 1972. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1985, at 64
(105th ed. 1984).
In 1980, when almost one-fifth of all babies born in the United States were illegitimate, 48% of
all black babies and 11% of all white babies born had unwed mothers. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF TRENDS AND POLICY, 1969-1984, Briefing Papers at 2 (1985).
22. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1985, at 64 (1984). About 267,800 of those births were to mothers under 20

23.

years old. Id.
See Leepson, supra note 3, at 860.
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dissipated in recent years. 24 Nonetheless, society has not readily accepted
the practice of relinquishing their babies for adoption.25 Peers and relatives
pressure young mothers to keep babies.2 6 Many social workers admit they
do not present adoption as an option to unwed mothers for fear of alienating or upsetting their clients.2 7
Unwed mothers who keep babies tend to be of lower socioeconomic status, and they are more likely to require government assistance to support
their children.2" Compared with peers who offer babies for adoption, unwed
mothers who keep their babies are more likely to come from broken or
unhappy homes, lack self-confidence and exhibit neurotic traits on personality tests.2 9 Moreover, research shows single parenthood places undue
stress upon the parent, thereby increasing the likelihood of child abuse.3 °
Furthermore, unwed mothers often fall into child abuse-prone demographic
categories, such as low education level, 3 low social class,3 2 low income33
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.

See Leynes, supra note 9, at 105; Leepson, supra note 3, at 860. Contributing to the trend have
been the human rights movement, increased presentation in the media of explicit sexual material
and the decline of traditional marriage. Resnick, supra note 9, at 7.
Increased reports of battered children in recent years may indicate that parents who wish to relinquish their children feel compelled not to do so. See M. BENET, supra note 2, at 215-16.
See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 331. Unwed minority mothers tend to face greater pressure
than their white counterparts to keep their babies. At one Detroit adoption agency, no more than
10% of black clients choose abortion, and no more than one percent opt for adoption. Resnick,
supra note 9, at 7.
Regardless of race, mothers who give up babies often suffer from feelings of grief and shame for
some time after relinquishing their babies. See Leynes, supra note 9, at 112.
Some social workers admit they never raise the subject of adoption. Others present adoption
briefly, as one item on a list of pregnancy alternatives. Many social workers are uncomfortable
with the idea themselves, and their ambivalence unnerves clients considering adoption as an alternative. Musick, Handler & Waddill, supra note 9, at 27.
See D. GILL, ILLEGITIMACY, SEXUALITY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 88-89, 95-96 (1977);

Leynes, supra note 9, at 108-09. The availability of welfare funds makes it financially feasible for
unwed mothers to keep their children. See Leepson, supra note 3, at 860 n.2; ADOPTION
FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 19. Some social welfare observers maintain that welfare rules may
make it very difficult to collect benefits in two-parent families, thus actually discouraging marriage.
See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUMMARY OF POOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF TRENDS

AND POLICY, 1969-1984, at 17-18 (1985).
Indeed, unwed mothers in the most destitute of situations may believe that they have the most
to gain by keeping their children. The Rev. Bruce Ritter, who operates Convenant House, a home
for teenage runaways in New York City, told students at the University of Notre Dame that no
pregnant teen at Covenant House had ever offered her baby for adoption. According to Ritter, the
young woman who visits Covenant House wants to keep her child, since having a baby is the most
important thing she has ever done. It gives her someone who will love her and depend on her. In
addition, the baby qualifies the mother for welfare payments and an apartment of her own. Adoption, Ritter observed, is an alternative mostly used by unwed women from middle class homes.
Address by the Rev. Bruce Ritter at the University of Notre Dame (Jan. 31, 1986).
29. See D. GILL, supra note 28, at 88-89; Leynes, supra note 9, at 107-09; Resnick, supra note 9, at 6.
Unwed mothers with little education and who report difficulty getting along with their parents are
also more likely to keep their babies. See D. GILL, supra note 28, at 95-96; Resnick, supra note 9,
at 6.
30. See J. LEAVITIT, CHILD ABUSE AND CHILD NEGLECT: RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 170 (1983).
31.

See Pelton, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 23, 28 (L. Pelton ed. 1981). A 1984 study found that only 53.5% of

never-married mothers in the United States were high school graduates. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 33, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1984, at 52 (1985).

32. See Pelton, supra note 31, at 26; J. LEAVITT, supra note 30, at 170; Gil, The United States Versus
Child Abuse, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 291, 298 (L. Pelton ed.

1981); Elmer, Traumatized Children, Chronic Illness and Poverty, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 185, 186 (L. Pelton ed. 1981).

33.

In 1983, 75.1% of all families headed by never-married women fell below the poverty threshold,

Adoption Reform

1986]

and poor housing conditions.34 Youth also makes unwed mothers more
likely to be child abusers.3 5 Clinical studies also show the psychological
imbalances exhibited by many unwed mothers who keep their children lead
to child abuse. 3 6 In addition to being physically harmed, child abuse victims
often carry lifelong mental scars. 7
Adoption may be the best solution for mother and child in many cases
of unwed pregnancy.3 8 Even in cases where parent does not abuse child,
lawmakers should recognize that poverty itself is harmful to the development of children.3 9 The challenge before legislators is to encourage adoption of those children otherwise destined to be poverty-cycle victims in an
era in which many unwed mothers are rejecting adoption.
ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Adoption has existed since the formation of organized communities. 4

34.
35.
36.

37.

38.

39.

the highest poverty rate of any type of family. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF TRENDS AND POLICY, 1969-1984, Briefing Papers at 5 (1985). Of the 13.8
million U.S. children living below the poverty line in 1983, 1.8 million were in families headed by
never-married mothers. Id. at 1. Studies show that the more extreme the poverty conditions in
which a family lives, the greater the incidence and severity of child abuse. See Pelton, supra note
3 1, at 28-30. In addition, the vast majority of deaths from child abuse come from poor families. See
id. at 29-30; R. GELLES & C. CORNELL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 56 (1985); Gil, supra
note 32, at 298-99.
See R. GELLES & C. CORNELL, supra note 33, at 57; D. GILL, supra note 28, at 298-99.
Young adults are more likely to abuse their children than are older parents. See R. GELLES & C.
CORNELL, supra note 33, at 56.
Unresolved identity conflicts, depression, feelings of worthlessness and inadequate self-esteem are
common factors among child abusers. See S. PALLONE & L. MALKEMES, HELPING PARENTS
WHO ABUSE THEIR CHILDREN 10-11 (1984). The basic sense of mistrust found in abusive parents
makes it difficult for them to form effective relationships with other adults; instead they turn to
their children to gratify needs. See id. at 11-13. Abusive parents transfer their sense of mistrust to
their children and interpret normal child behavior, such as bed-wetting and crying, as a sign of
rejection. Id. at 12-13.
Children cannot understand their parents' resort to abuse, and the confusion may affect the child
for life:
Abuse from a parent or other caretaker must be one of the most hurtful of all insults,
because it combines physical pain with the psychological blow of being attacked by one's
protector. The child has no way of judging the meaning of what is happening. His or her
perspective on adult behavior toward children is limited, and it is easy to believe that all
parents severely spank, beat, or do other violence to their offspring. Or the child may justify
the abusing parent's behavior by assuming the guilt of being bad and therefore deserving of
the blows.
• . . [T]he boy or girl grows up not only risking physical damage, but also holding a
distorted view of parent-child relationships, including a first-hand lesson in aggression between family members.
Elmer, supra note 32, at 185-86.
Indeed, recent investigations reinforce the conventional wisdom among adoption agency personnel
that adolescents who place children for adoption are psychologically better adjusted and would
make better parents than adolescents who choose to keep their children. See Resnick, supra note 9,
at 6.
Poverty produces stress in family life and creates health and safety hazards for children, regardless
of abuse. See Pelton, Introduction to THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1,

13 (L. Pelton ed. 1981). As one professor of social work put it:
[P]oor children, like their parents, must live among poor people. . . . Among other things
this means living where public transportation is erratic and undependable, garbage is picked
up only spasmodically, and the streets are more full of litter than they are elsewhere. Pri-

vate housing is outrageously expensive and falling apart. Danger lurks everywhere, from
the broken steps to the glass on the sidewalk to the young toughs of the neighborhood who
exact tribute from younger children.

Elmer, supra note 32, at 208-09.
40.

It was not uncommon for a couple to take in and care for a pregnant woman with the understand-
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Until the nineteenth century, adoption was most often arranged informally
by mutual acquaintances of the biological and adoptive parents.4 1 Such an
ad hoc system was prone to abuse, however, and reports of adopted children being used as cheap labor gave rise to the first legal regulations on
adoption.4 2

As states began to more closely regulate the adoption process, 43 adoption procedures changed. Modem procedures emphasize protecting the
confidentiality of adoption parties who wish to have their identities concealed. Today almost all states require that public agency adoption records
remain confidential, at least until the adoptee reaches majority.' In confidential (or closed) adoptions, biological and adoptive parents never meet. A
new birth certificate is issued for the child bearing the adoptive parents'
names, and all records identifying the biological parents are sealed. 45
In a nonconfidential (or open) adoption, adoptive and biological parents
exchange identifying information. In fact, biological parents can meet potential adoptive parents and participate in the selection of the couple that
will raise their baby.4 6 The agreement provides the adoptee with the names

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

ing that they would adopt her child after its birth. See Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, The Concept of
Open Adoption, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 196 (1975).
For an account of the history of adoption as far back as the ancient Romans, see M. LEAVY &
R. WEINBERG, LAW OF ADOPTION (4th ed. 1979).
See Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 40, at 197.
See A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 31.
All states had enacted adoption statutes by 1931. See Heffner, Adoption: New Ways to Build Families, STATE LEGISLATURES, May-June 1984, at 13.
Forty-nine states require that adoption records be sealed at birth. ALA. CODE § 26-10-5 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150(b)(Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-326.01 (Supp. 1985); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 56-141 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 227 (West Supp. 1986); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 10435 (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-113 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-53, 45-68m (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 923 (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.22 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-417 (Supp. 1985); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 578-14 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-258 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522
(Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-5 (West Supp. 1985-86); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 600.13 (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.570 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:72
(West Supp. 1985-86); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 533 (Supp. 1985-86); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 4.211 (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.67) (Callaghan Supp. 1985-86); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.1761 (West
Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-17-25, -31 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.135 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-126 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (Supp. 1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.140 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170B:19 (1978 & Supp. 1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-51 (West Supp. 1985-86); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-29 (1984); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-16 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West 1966); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.415 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-21 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (Supp. 1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-129 (1984); TEX. FAM. CODE § 11.17 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-15 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 449, 451 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE
§§ 63.1 - .235 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.330 (Supp. 1985-86); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-5-16 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.93 (Supp. 1985-86); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-104 (1977).
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-326.01 (Supp. 1985).
See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 328. Such arrangements, however, can have disastrous
results:
One risk is that a birth parent, having knowledge of the adoptee's whereabouts, will interfere with the adoptee and his relationship to his adoptive family at a time during the
adoptee's development when the adoptee may be adversely affected. ...
. . * A friendly visit by the birth mother to an infant unable to understand the distinction between birth parents and adoptive parents is different from the hostile visit of a birth
mother to a teenage adoptee in which the birth mother angrily declares that she is the
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of his or her biological parents and may even allow contact with the biological parents."
Proponents of confidential adoption believe confidentiality facilitates
closer bonding in the adoptive family.4 8 Advocates also argue that preventing the reappearance of biological parents makes the adoptive parents more
secure in their parental role.49 The unity of the adoptive family, however,
becomes a less crucial state interest after adoptees reach majority and assert
legal independence. 50 Two states allow adoptees access to their original
birth certificates when the adoptees reach the age of majority.5 ' The other
forty-eight states, however, keep adoption records under seal after adoptees
reach majority. 2
Most social workers and state adoption agency personnel support confidential records and believe adoption records should be opened only on a
case-by-case basis.53 Some states requiring confidential adoption allow
adoptees to acquire limited information about their biological parents.5 4 To

47.

48.
49.

50.

51.

52.
53.
54.

adoptee's real mother. Adoptive parents' tolerance of interference from birth parents may
change as the children pass from infancy through childhood and into adolescence.
Schur, The ABA Model State Adoption Act: Observationsfrom an Agency Perspective, 19 FAM. L.Q.
131, 139-40 (1985).
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that an adoption agreement in which the adoptive
parents grant the biological mother the right "to see and visit her said child at any and all reasonable times" is an enforceable contract. In re Adoption of a Minor, 291 N.E.2d 729, 731 (Mass.
1973).
See supra note 6 (discussing the benefits of sealed adoption records during the adoptee's minority).
In In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203, 397 A.2d 511 (1979), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island protected the state's interest in seeing that adoptive relationships " 'bloom and grow forever,' free of
the threat of. . . the appearance of a natural, well-intended parent who just wishes to drop by and
see or talk to his or her offspring." 397 A.2d at 513. Christine, a biological mother, sought court
permission to have a guardian ad litem contact the adoptive parents of Christine's biological child
to determine if they would allow Christine to contact the child. Id. at 511-12. The supreme court
quashed a lower court order that had granted Christine's request:
The peek permitted by the court's order casts a cloud of uncertainty upon the minds of all
adoptive parents who now realize that some day a court attache may be at their doorstep
acting as a courier for a parent whose right to visit with or talk to the adoptive couple's
child was supposedly terminated.
Id. at 513-14.
Stating that "[i]t is too often forgotten that an adopted child eventually grows up," one judge
suggested that courts use a sliding scale based on the age of an adoptee to determine whether to
grant the adoptee's request to see original birth records. See Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d
760, 767 (Mo. 1978) (Seiler, J., concurring). At the time of adoption, the sliding scale would give
greatest weight to the desire of biological and adoptive parents to have sealed records. Id. at 767.
As the adoptee grows older, however, the situation changes:
[T]he interest of the adoptee advances. . . in contradistinction to those of the natural and
adopted parents, which recede. The adoptee's interests become of greater import as he or
she grows, to the point where, as an adult, they predominate over those interests which
once had a superior claim.
Id. at 767-68 (footnote omitted).
ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1975) (sealed records opened by court order or upon demand of adoptee
after the adoptee reaches age 19); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1985) (supplementary birth certificate is filed with original birth certificate; records available for inspection with court order, or
adoptee may demand to see the documents upon reaching legal age).
See statutory provisions cited infra notes 55 and 56.
Many social workers see such practices as consistent with general policies of client confidentiality.
In addition, sealed records policies posit greater power and authority in the hands of the social
service professional. L. McTAGGART, supra note 2, at 224; Leepson, supra note 3, at 872.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West 1985) (court may issue order allowing access to relevant
nonidentifying information); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-13:19 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (adoptee
over age 21 may request nonidentifying background information and health history); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-7-53 (Supp. 1985) (adoptee over age 18 may receive nonidentifying physical descriptions and information about health, medical history and background); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26
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examine information that could identify natural parents, however, adoptees
in forty-eight states must have a court order,"5 which often may be obtained
only upon a showing of "good cause." 56
THE ADOPTION RECORDS BATTLE
After decades of tacit acceptance, opposition has mounted to the sealedrecords system.5 7 With an estimated two million couples waiting to adopt,5"
critics want to restrike the balance to better accommodate the needs of
adoptees5 9 and biological parents who wish to reunite. Organizations such

55.

56.

57.

58.
59.

(1984) (adoptee over age 21 may receive nonidentifying information concerning heritage, general
physical appearance and health); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (adoptee
may receive nonidentifying information at judge's discretion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-615.2 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.93 (Supp. 1985-86) (adoptee over age 18 may receive
medical and genetic information, as well as nonidentifying social history).
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-120 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68m (West 1981) (court
order allowed for "the health or medical treatment" of the adoptee); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 924 (Supp. 1984) (court may allow inspection of only that part of adoption record necessary to
protect the adoptee's health "or the health of any blood relative of the adopted individual"); GA.
STAT. ANN. § 74-417 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-258 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522
(Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West 1981) (court may open records if shown to
be necessary to save the life of or prevent irreparable physical harm to an adoptee or the adoptee's
offspring, but court must make every effort to protect the anonymity of the biological parents); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.570 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:73 (West Supp. 1986)
(court may issue order after a showing of compelling reasons and only to the extent necessary to
satisfy such compelling necessity); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 524 (Supp. 1985-86); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-329 (1984) (court may issue order upon finding "the individual needs the
medical information for the health of the individual or a blood relative of the individual," but in no
case may the identity or location of biological parents be revealed); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.31
(West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 193.135,453.120 (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 127.140 (1981); N.C. GEN STAT. § 48-26 (1984) (court order upon finding that disclosure is in
the best interest of the adoptee or public); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Page Supp. 1984);
OR. REV. STAT. § 432.420 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-21 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-6-15 (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-131 (Supp. 1985) (court order may issue if
judge finds disclosure of information in best interest of the adoptee or public); W. VA. CODE § 165-16 (1985). See also statutory provisions cited infra note 56.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150(b) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-141(c) (Supp. 1985) (court
order in exceptional cases where court finds, "by clear and convincing evidence, that good cause
exists for inspection"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10439 (West Supp. 1986) ("good and
compelling cause"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-104 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(d) (West
1985) (statute presents list of factors judge may consider in determining whether "good cause"
exists); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-15 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-12 (West Supp. 1985-86)
(emergency medical need or similar good cause); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5C (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.67) (Callaghan Supp. 1985-86); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 93-17-25, -31 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-126 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (Supp.
1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-13:19 (1978 & Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53
(Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney
1977 & Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16.11 (Supp. 1985) (court order "for good cause
shown in exceptional circumstances"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 57 (West 1966); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX.
FAM. CODE § 11.17 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-15 (1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 451, 452 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.330 (Supp. 1985-86); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.93 (Supp. 1985-86); WYO. STAT. § 1-22104 (1977).
Among those criticizing the state of adoption are sociologists, psychiatrists, physicians and members of the legal profession. See Levin, The Adoption Trilemma: The Adult Adoptee's Emerging
Search for his Ancestral Identity, 8 BALT. L. REV. 496, 497-501 (1979).
Leepson, supra note 3, at 859.
One study found that many adoptees feel isolated and alienated "due to the break in the continuity
of life through the generations that their adoption represents. For some, the existing block to the
past may create a feeling that there is a block to the future as well." Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The
Reunion of Adoptees and Birth Relatives, 3 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 195 (1974).
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as Concerned United Birthparents, ° Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association 6' and Orphan Voyage 62 have led the fight for access to sealed adoption
records by using legislative and legal channels.63
Out of frustration caused by slow progress in legislative chambers and
courtrooms, the adoption reformers have set out to help themselves. Many
have established registration networks through which parties to a confidential adoption can register their desire to re-establish contact years later. The
determination of group members who have launched such programs has
focused attention on the plight of adoptees. As American voters and legislators have become more sympathetic to the concerns of adoptees, so have
adoption laws. The number of states recently passing registration provisions
exemplifies this trend.'
Most states with registration systems have mutual-consent registries,
which allow adoptees and biological parents to register their desire to meet,
provided the adoptee has reached a certain age, usually eighteen.6 5 Typi60.
61.

62.

63.

64.
65.

Concerned United Birthparents, Dover, N.H., was founded in 1976 by biological parents and
others who support adoption reform. CUB seeks to open birth records to adoptees and biological
parents and allow legal recognition of the biological parents' ongoing concern about adoptees.
Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association, New York, N.Y., was founded in 1971 and reports
membership of 50,000 adoptees, biological parents and adoptive parents. ALMA's main objective
is to provide assistance to biological parents seeking adoptees and to adoptees seeking their biological parents.
Orphan Voyage, Cederedge, Colo., was founded in 1953 by adoption reform pioneer Jean Paton.
The group, made up of adoptees, as well and biological parents and adoptive parents, assists in
establishing relationships between adult adoptees and their biological parents. Orphan Voyage also
attempts to inform adoptive parents of the needs of adoptees before the children reach majority
and to give guidance to surrendering biological parents.
Adoptees have unsuccessfully tried several legal theories in attempting to obtain access to original
adoption records:
In Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978), the adoptee argued Missouri's sealed
records policy violated her first amendment right to receive information and her rights of liberty,
privacy and equal protection. Id. at 762-65.
In Matter of Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E.2d 884 (1980), aff'd, 84 111. 2d 323, 418
N.E.2d 751 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 806 (1981), an adoptee argued Illinois' sealed records
policy violated his right to receive information. 407 N.E.2d at 886-87. The adoptee also argued the
policy violated his ninth amendment fundamental right to an identity and his rights of privacy, due
process and equal protection. Id. at 886-89. Finally, the adoptee asserted his status as an adult
should, in itself, constitute good cause for allowing access to his adoption records. Id. at 889.
In Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904
(1978), a group of adoptees argued that they should be considered a "suspect classification" and
that the Illinois adoption law violated their equal protection rights. 569 F.2d at 432-34. The
adoptees also argued their right "to acquire useful information" as protected by a penumbra of
rights emanating from the first, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution was
violated. Id. at 432-34. Finally, the adoptees argued their thirteenth amendment right to be free
from involuntary servitude was violated. Id. at 433-34.
For an exploration of the constitutional issues involved in adoption records cases, see Note,
The Adult Adoptee's ConstitutionalRight to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196 (1975).
Since September 1984, 10 states-Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Tennessee-have established adoption registration systems. See statutory provisions cited infra notes 65 and 66.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-144 (Supp. 1985) (adult adoptee, each adoptive parent and each biological
parent must place his or her name in the registry before any disclosure can be made); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 224(5)(b) (Supp. 1986) (at time of relinquishment, the biological parents are asked
whether they would like to participate in a registry that discloses biological parents' names to
adoptees who make a request after reaching 21); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-113.5 (Supp. 1985)
(registry allows relatives of deceased biological parents and adoptees to register); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.51 (West Supp. 1985) (adoptees, biological parents and adoptive parents can file information
about themselves and specify persons to whom such information should be released); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-259A (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (biological parent
files statement at time of adoption about whether information is to be released; adoptee may regis-
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cally, when an adoptee registers his or her consent to exchange identifying
information, state adoption personnel check their files to see whether the
biological parents have filed affidavits consenting to the release of information. If they have, information from the adoptee's original birth certificate is
released. 66
The most progressive state registry programs contain search-and-consent provisions, which notify the biological parents when the adoptee has
registered. 67 While procedure varies among states, search-and-consent statutes commonly require an adoption agency employee to make direct, discrete contact with biological parents to notify them of the adoptee's wish to
have access to identifying information. Biological parents may refuse to release any information, but the adoptee receives assurance that they are
aware of the request. 68 For biological parents, a search-and-consent provision operates like a mutual-consent registry-biological parents can register
their consent to release information at any time, but they cannot initiate a
search for the adoptee.
Mutual-consent and search-and-consent registries are popular because

66.
67.

68.

ter at age 21, or earlier with consent of his or her adoptive parents); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.575
(Baldwin 1985) (applies only to pre-adoptive brother-sister relationships; each sibling, upon reaching age 18, may file information for release to siblings); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:91-93 (West
Supp. 1986) (adoptees and biological parents can register at any time after the adoptee reaches age
25; registration must be renewed every five years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2706-A (1980)
(adoptee must be over age 18 to register); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.68) (Callaghan Supp.
1985-86) (for adoptions in which biological parents' rights terminated after September 12, 1980,
information is automatically released to requesting adoptee over 18 unless either biological parent
files a written request that no information be released); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-124, -130 (1984 &
Supp. 1985) (adoptee must be over age 25 to register; adoptive parent or parents may at any time
sign a notice of nonconsent stating that no information on the adoptee's original birth certificate is
to be released before the death of the adoptive parent or parents); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.007
(1979) (adoptee must be over age 18 to register); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-8:19 (1978 & Supp.
1985) (adoptee must be over 21 to register; biological parents are asked to reaffirm their desire to
be contacted before information is released); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Supp. 1985) (adoptee
must be over 18 to register); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.40, .41 (Page Supp. 1984) (adoptee
must be over 21 to register); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.450 to .500 (adoptee must be over 21 to
register; biological parents can register earlier but must renew registration when the adoptee turns
21); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (adoptee over age 18 can petition to have
court contact biological parents and request consent; court may refuse to do so at its discretion);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (adoptee must be over 21 to register;
biological parents have 30 days to reconsider release of information after adoptee makes request);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15.3 (Supp. 1985) (consenting biological parents and adoptee indicate
to whom the information may be released).
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (biological parent files statement as to whether information is to be released at time of adoption; adoptee may register at age 21
or earlier with consent of adoptive parents).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68j (West 1981) (adoptee can petition court to have biological parents contacted to see if they consent to release of identifying information; consent is also required
from living adoptive parents); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259:49 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) (after
adoptee over age 21 requests search, state tries to locate biological parents; when located, biological
parents have 120 days to request that no disclosure be made); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-15-16
(Supp. 1985) (after adoptee over age 21 registers, biological parents are located and given 60 days
to file affidavit requesting no disclosure); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-141 (Supp. 1985) (after
adoptee over age 25 requests search, birth parents are located and asked whether they consent to
release of information); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.433 (Supp. 1985-86) (after adoptee over age 21
requests search, biological parents are found and asked whether they consent to release of
information).
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.433 (Supp. 1985-86) (after adult adoptee requests identifying information, biological parents are notified of request and asked to submit a consent form if they wish to
have information revealed).
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they carve out an exception to adoption confidentiality requirements when
biological parents and child, as consenting adults, want to share
information.
LEARNING FROM INDEPENDENT ADOPTION
Because circumstances surrounding unwed pregnancies vary, biological
parents have different ideas about how much personal information they
want made available to children they offer for adoption. Woman A, for example, wants to preserve her privacy and avoid any repercussions of adoption in her later life.69 Because she lives in Alabama, a state requiring that
identifying information about birth be made available to an adult adoptee,7 °
Woman A finds a state-sponsored adoption unacceptable. She opts for
abortion.
In contrast, Woman B struggles with the thought of giving away her
baby and never knowing what has happened to her child. She lives in a state
that permanently seals adoption records.7 1 Her only state-sanctioned adoption option would force her to spend a lifetime wondering about the welfare
of her child.72 Woman B decides to keep her baby.
Woman A and Woman B could structure adoptions to meet their needs
if their states allowed independent adoption.7 3 An independent (or private)
adoption is a contractual agreement between biological and adoptive parents concerning legal rights to a child.74 Attorneys7 5 normally draft these
agreements to satisfy the participating parties. The flexibility offered by independent adoption has made the procedure popular in the United States.
In 1982, one-third of the 50,720 adoptions by non-relatives in the United
States were independently arranged.7 6 Perhaps the most notable result of
the flexibility of independent adoption is that interested parties can use it to
structure nonconfidential adoptions, even where state adoption agencies are
forbidden to offer nonconfidential adoptions. In addition, independent
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.

For an exploration of constitutional issues involved, see Note, Sealed Adoption Records and the
ConstitutionalRight of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451 (1982).
ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1975). Kansas law would beget the same result. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 652423 (1985).
Most states will open the adoption records of an adult adoptee, but only by court order, which
requires a showing of "good cause" to examine the records. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
Consider In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203, 397 A.2d 511 (1979), where an unwed, minor mother
executed consent for adoption shortly after the birth of her child. For the next 11 years, Christine
contacted on numerous occasions the adoption agency and family court to seek information about
the child and to request permission to visit the child. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled
against a petition by Christine for access to the names and addresses of her child's adoptive parents. 397 A.2d at 514. See supra note 49.
At least six states bar independent adoptions by requiring that a state agency be used in legal
adoptions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63 (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904
(Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178(555.26) (Callaghan Supp. 1985-86); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-17 (1982).
See Note, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 329 (1981).
Where state law allows, independent adoptions also can be arranged by doctors and clergymen. See
Heffner, supra note 43, at 14.
See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 104. One estimate is that independent adoptions made
up 50% of all adoptions by nonrelatives in 1983. See Leepson, supra note 3, at 862.
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adoptions have had laudable success in placing special-needs children.77 Independent adoptions also save tax money because expenses-including the
biological mother's living expenses-are covered privately.78
Independent adoption does have disadvantages. First, state agency
adoptions usually cost less.7 9 Second, an attorney arranging the independent adoption has an overriding economic interest in seeing the adoption go
through.8" In contrast, the sole interest of state adoption personnel is to
ensure that the baby will have a good home.8" In addition, some states allow
attorneys to arrange independent placements without any counseling for
the biological mothers8 2 and to provide for immediate placement of the
child after birth.8 3 Biological mothers may be unduly pressured to approve
the adoption. They may not have sufficient time after the birth to reconsider
their decisions.8 4
State laws routinely require public adoption agencies to give biological
parents a breathing period to reconsider consent to adoption.8 5 State stat77.
78.
79.

80.

81.
82.

83.

84.
85.

Also referred to as "hard-to-place" children, special-needs adoptees are older, minority, foreign
and mentally or physically disabled children. See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 328.
Many states allow an adopting couple to pay interim costs of the biological mother. See Note,
supra note 74, at 323, 330. See also, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-126(c) (1974); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 273(a) (West 1970).
Adoption fees vary greatly. State agency fees range from no charge to more than $10,000. In 1985,
adoptive parents paid an average of more than $6,000. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 23.
The actual cost of a normal state agency adoption is estimated at $11,300, but most agencies keep
costs down through fund-raising, subsidies, volunteer services and, when possible, taking advantage of insurance benefits. Id. at 24. Independent adoptions also vary greatly in cost, ranging from
less than $2,000 to more than $10,000. Id. at 25. Attorneys' fees and medical expenses for the
biological mother can total more than $20,000 in an independent adoption. Leepson, supra note 3,
at 863, 869.
The attorney's fee agreement may be contingent upon the successful completion of the adoption.
Whenever a party has a pecuniary interest in adoption there may be cause for concern.
In a world in which people act fairly and honestly, governmental protection and regulation
of the adoption field would be unnecessary. In a world in which desperate people will do
anything to get a baby and in which unethical suppliers are willing to meet the demand, it is
reasonable to expect abuses.
Schur, supra note 46, at 139-40.
Even where states do not require adoption agencies to make pre-placement studies, adoption agencies can lose their licenses for failure to do so. Practitioners of independent adoptions bear no risk
for assisting in inappropriate placements. See Schur, supra note 46, at 138.
Counseling is valuable because each biological parent must understand the finality of a decision for
adoption. Some adoption agency personnel counsel biological parents to refuse to relinquish children "if there is any thought in their minds that they might at some future date seek return of the
child." Id. at 137 (emphasis in original).
Many state statutes do not allow public adoption agencies to place children for a period of time
after consent for adoption is granted to allow the biological parents time to reconsider. See, e.g.,
GA. STAT. ANN. § 74-404 (Supp. 1985) (consent may be executed only after birth and may be
withdrawn within 10 days). Independent adoptions are not bound by many such provisions, but
some commentators suggest that unlicensed adoption intermediaries should be required to grant
equal protection to biological parents. See Schur, supra note 46, at 140.
See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 336.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(b)(1) (Supp. 1985) (consent may be withdrawn within 10 days of signing or birth, whichever is later); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-107(B) (Supp. 1985) (consent may not be
given until 72 hours after birth); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-208 (Supp. 1985) (consent may be executed any time after birth); CAL. CIV. CODE § 226(a) (West 1982) (consent may only be withdrawn by court determination that it would be in adoptee's best interest); COLO. REV. STAT. § 194-103 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (consent may be withdrawn only upon showing of fraud or duress);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-611 (West 1981) (consent may be withdrawn until any time before
adoption decree issued); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 909 (Supp. 1984) (consent may be withdrawn
by court permission if petition for withdrawal is filed within 60 days); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082
(West 1985) (consent may only be executed after birth); GA. STAT. ANN. § 74-404 (Supp. 1985)
(consent may be executed only after birth and may be withdrawn within 10 days); HAWAII REV.
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utes are also likely to require thorough examination of potential adoptive
86
parents to determine whether they are likely to make good parents.
Critics of independent adoption argue that without neutral supervision
and implementation, independent adoptions do not pass the rigid scrutiny
that state agencies impose on the process.8 7 Private adoption proponents
argue that a ban on independent adoption would create a "black market" in
which desperate couples would offer exorbitant sums of money to acquire
children. 8 Also, proponents allege that a ban on independent adoption

86.
87.

88.

STAT. § 571-61 (1976 & Supp. 1984) (consent may be given any time after mother's sixth month of
pregnancy); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (1976 & Supp. 1985) (consent may be withdrawn with court
permission); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1511 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (consent may not be given until
72 hours after birth); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6 (West Supp. 1985-86) (consent may be executed
any time after birth); IOWA STAT. ANN. § 600.7 (West 1981) (consent may be withdrawn before
issuance of adoption decree); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2102 (1983) (consent may be withdrawn if
fraud or duress is shown); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (Baldwin 1985) (consent may be withdrawn
before birth); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:422.6.11 (West Supp. 1986) (consent may not be given
until five days after birth; it may be withdrawn within 30 days); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 532 (1981 & Supp. 1985-86) (consent revocable if fraud or duress is shown); MD. FAM. LAW.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-311, -314 (1984) (consent may be withdrawn before issuance of decree of adoption); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) (consent may not be executed
until four calendar days after birth); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.29) (Callaghan Supp. 198586) (irrevocable consent executed before a judge after investigation and explanation of consequences); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (West 1982) (consent may be withdrawn within 10 working
days of execution); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9 (1973) (consent may not be given until three days
after birth); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.030 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (consent may be given any time after
birth); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-8-109, 111, 112 (1985) (state counselor must interview consenting biological parent before adoption is allowed); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-106 (1984) (consent
must be given before an officer authorized to acknowledge deeds); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 127.053
(1979), 127.070 (1981) (consent may be given any time after birth); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 170-B:7, :9, :10 (1979 & Supp. 1985) (consent may not be given until 72 hours after birth); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41 (West Supp. 1985-86) (consent must be acknowledged by court officer); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-7-38 (Supp. 1985) (consent may not be given until 72 hours after birth); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 115b (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1986) (consent must be executed before a court
officer); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-7, -11 (1984) (consent becomes irrevocable after adoption decree
issued); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-07, -08 (1981) (consent may be given any time after birth);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.08, .09 (Page 1980) (consent may not be given until 72 hours after
birth); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.5, .10 (West 1966) (consent becomes irrevocable upon
issuance of adoption decree); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.270 (1981) (consent revocable only if fraud or
duress is shown); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 23, §§ 2501, 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (consent may be
executed after adoptee has been in custody of an adoption agency for a minimum of three days);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-5 (Supp. 1985) (consent revocable only if fraud or duress is shown); S.C.
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-7-1710, -1720 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1985) (consent becomes irrevocable
when decree of adoption is issued); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-4, -4.1 (1984) (consent
revocable only if coerced or compelled); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-114, -117 (1984) (consent
revocable until issuance of adoption decree); TEX. FAM. CODE § 15.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp.
1986) (consent may be executed any time after birth); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Supp. 1985)
(consent irrevocable unless fraud or duress shown); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 432 (Supp. 1985)
(consent must be given in writing); VA. CODE § 63.1-225 (1980) (consent may not be executed
until 10 days after birth); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.160 (Supp. 1985-86) (consent cannot
become operative until 48 hours after birth); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-4-3, -4, -5 (Supp. 1985) (consent
may not be given until 72 hours after birth); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.42, .835, .837 (Supp. 1985-86)
(adoption petition must include petition to terminate biological parents' parental rights); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-22-109 (1977) (consent irrevocable unless fraud or duress is shown).
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-109 (1985) (requires state officials to examine the child, conduct interviews with biological and prospective adoptive parents and report to the court that the
parties understand all ramifications of adoption).
At least one critic has suggested the banning of independent adoption.
To ban non-agency adoptions may seem . . . to discriminate against the poor and those
who practice informal adoption. But by funneling everyone through the same system, it
may help to ensure that the system operates responsibly and fairly-if the well-off and
articulate must use it like everyone else, they will not allow it to deteriorate.
M. BENET, supra note 2, at 213-14.
A banning of independent adoption has been compared with Prohibition.
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would reduce the number of adoptions. Connecticut, for example, suffered
an almost fifty percent decrease in total adoptions the year after its 1959
ban on private adoptions.8 9 The Connecticut experience demonstrates that
private adoption, with its flexibility for structuring confidential and nonconfidential adoptions, appeals to unwed mothers considering adoption. 9°
RECOMMENDATIONS
State legislatures should enact statutes flexible enough to accommodate
confidential and nonconfidential adoption. 9 In doing so, legislators should
study the extent to which unwed mothers have used independent adoption
to plan for the futures of children they give up for adoption.92 States should
then enact laws that leave the parties free to contract for provisions such as
visitation rights and information exchange between adoptee and biological
parents.
If states continue to offer only confidential or nonconfidential adoption,
only independent adoption will work for those dissatisfied with a state's
particular form of adoption. But independent adoption is not legal in all
states, 93 and, even where available, its cost excludes some potential adoption parties.9 4

Although injecting the flexibility of independent adoption into statesponsored adoption is a laudable goal, each state's adoption package also
should permit independent adoption. Private adoption has proved its value
by placing thousands of children each year. 95 Independent adoption also
provides another source through which would-be adoptive parents can locate a child. The independent process is prone to abuse, however, and states
should amend their adoption laws to regulate it. Among the requirements
that states should apply to independent adoptions are mandatory pre-adoption counseling for biological and adoptive parents, provisions that allow

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

The most compelling argument against ending legal private adoption is that it will only
worsen the problems it attempts to solve. As America discovered in its experiment with
Prohibition, the state can outlaw supply but cannot eliminate demand. The desire-the
need-to have a child cannot possibly be regulated by law. Adopting couples know that
attorneys are the best and fastest source of babies, and, as far as these couples are concerned, it's the end result-the son or daughter-that counts. The only effect of prohibition
on private adoption will be to create a genuine black market, where all semblance of procedure and legality is abandoned, where children not legitimately adopted are only further
penalized, where deals grow ever more furtive, subterfuges multiply, prices skyrocket.
L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 329.
Id. The adoption rate remained stable in other states in which the law did not change during that
period. Id.
As one independent adoption advocate has stated:
[O]utlawing private adoption would ... deprive young women of the only means by which
they themselves can plan for the future of children they must give up and prevent them
from choosing adoptive parents from among people they know. It would also penalize
many private grass-roots adoption movements ... [that place] foreign and "hard-to-place"
children with far better track records than many agencies.
Id. at 328.
For a proposed statute that allows adoption parties to determine whether the adoption should be
confidential or nonconfidential, see Comment, supra note 6, at 481-84.
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 328-29.
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biological parents to deliberate before consenting to adoption and restrictions on amounts paid by adoptive parents to cover legal and medical expenses for independently arranged adoptions.
Mandatory pre-adoption counseling for biological and adoptive parents
would fulfill the role of pre-adoption studies that are required for state
adoptions. A determination that potential adoptive parents would make
good parents would give the biological parents peace of mind and would
protect the state's interest in finding a fit home for the child. In addition,
counseling for the biological parents should not be overlooked. The decision
to offer a child for adoption has lifelong ramifications; biological parents
should 96be counseled to make sure they know its legal and emotional
effects.

Provisions requiring biological parents to deliberate before consenting to
adoption would ensure that each biological parent has carefully considered
the decision. Currently, some states allow no time period for reconsideration of an adoption consent, but better statutes require a reconsideration
period.97 States also vary as to when consent may be executed by the biological parents.9 8 The best statutes do not allow a biological parent to give
consent until several days after birth. This allows the reality of birth to set
in before a parent must relinquish a child.9 9

Restrictions on the amount payable by adoptive parents to cover legal
and medical expenses for independently arranged adoptions would prevent
desperate would-be adopters from paying "black market" rates for children.
Some states already have such restrictions."° The cost of unregulated independent adoption forces many potential adoptive parents out of the market. This may not seem tragic because adoption applications far exceed the
number of available healthy infants. It is tragic, though, when an otherwise
deserving couple is denied an equal chance to adopt a child simply because
other couples are financially better off. If state adoption offered the same
advantages as independent adoption, all potential adoptive parents would
receive equal consideration. When state adoption alternatives fall short, affluent would-be adoptive parents find private means to accomplish adoption.' O' The less wealthy are left with an incomplete solution, 10 2 and an
96.
97.

See id. at 335 (survey found two-thirds of those biological mothers who planned to give up their
children for adoption had doubts during their pregnancies, and more than 80% would like to have
had counseling).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See also L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 335.

98.

See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 335.

99.

See, e.g., GA. STAT. ANN. § 74-404 (Supp. 1985) (consent may be executed only after birth and
may be withdrawn within 10 days); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:422.6-.11 (West Supp. 1986) (consent may not be given until five days after birth and may be withdrawn within 30 days); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) (consent may not be executed until four
calendar days after birth); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-9 (1973) (consent may not be given until
three days after birth); VA. CODE § 63.1-225 (1980) (consent may not be executed until 10 days
after birth).
100. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.54) (Callaghan 1980) (except for charges and fees approved by a court, no person may give or receive any money or other consideration in connection
with any aspect of adoption). See also Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1981) (holding that the Michigan code's prohibition precludes payment to
surrogate mothers).
101. See L. MCTAGGART, supra note 2, at 329.
102. See id.
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incomplete solution is often no solution.
Even if costs are regulated, independent adoptions will cost more than
agency adoptions. Thus, the most significant improvement to state adoption
law would be the creation of public agency adoptions with the flexibility of
independent adoption so parties can structure adoptions to meet specific
needs.
Adoption parties must be able to rely on the state to protect adoption
agreements, particularly when confidentiality is promised. Adoption statutes must view confidential adoptions as contracts not subject to alteration
at a later date to attract potential adoption parties who desire confidentiality for life.
Registry provisions, however, do not jeopardize the privacy of biological
parents who choose confidential adoptions. In most states, identifying information cannot be released at any time without the birth parents' consent. Io3
Mutual-consent registries, as well as search-and-consent registries, allow for
flexibility in cases where biological parents later change their minds about
contact with their offspring. All current registry provisions require that the
adoptee reach the age of majority before registering. Such age provisions
protect state interests in the unity of the adoptive family while the adoptee
is growing up. Once the adoptee reaches majority, though, registry provisions recognize that the interests of the adoptee should take precedence
over the interests of the adoptive parents. " Legislators should enact
search-and-consent registries because such provisions aggressively serve the
adult adoptee's legitimate interest but do not compromise the right of confidentiality promised biological parents.
CONCLUSION
States have an interest in promoting the welfare of children born in potentially harmful situations. The living conditions provided by many young,
unwed mothers often prove to be such situations. Children of unwed
mothers are more likely to be abused, and they are likely to be trapped in
103. In recent years, some states have reversed the normal presumption and have enacted statutes that
release identifying information about biological parents to requesting adult adoptees unless the
biological parents file notice of nonconsent. Michigan, for example, operates a traditional mutualconsent registry for adoptees whose biological parents' rights were terminated before September
12, 1980 (that is, a biological parent must file an affidavit consenting to the release identifying
information before any such information may be given to a requesting adult adoptee). For adoptees
whose biological parents' rights were terminated after September 12, 1980, however, identifying
information about biological parents will be given to a requesting adult adoptee unless either biological parent has filed a written request that information not be released. The provision, in effect,
establishes a mutual-consent registry in which biological parents automatically consent to release
of information unless they file an affidavit stating otherwise. See MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178(555.68) (Callaghan Supp. 1985-86).
Minnesota operates a search-and-consent provision that places the burden of filing an affidavit
on the biological parent who wishes to maintain confidentiality. Within six months of receiving a
request for identifying information from an adoptee over age 21, state adoption personnel personally notify each biological parent of the request. A biological parent then has 120 days to file an
affidavit stating that information on the original birth certificate should not be released. If no
action is taken, the information is released on the 121st day. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259:49
(West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
104. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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the poverty cycle.' 0 5 Adoption certainly is not the answer for all unwed
mothers, but in many cases adoption enhances the child's welfare. The state
has a responsibility to make adoption a viable alternative for as many unwed mothers as possible.
That few young, unwed mothers in the United States have found adoption an attractive option for pregnancy resolution in recent years indicates
that current state adoption statutes have failed to meet unwed mothers'
needs. Although, several states have experimented with adoption statutes in
recent years, none has enacted a statute allowing the parties participating in
a state-sponsored adoption to choose whether the confidentiality of adoption parties should be maintained. Such flexibility is available in independently arranged adoptions. State adoptions should offer the same choice. If
one accepts the thesis that biological parents have different needs regarding
the confidentiality of adoption, then no current public adoption program
can meet the needs of all biological parents who may choose adoption.
States should reform adoption law to meet these needs.
John M. Stoxen*

105. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
B.A., University of North Dakota, 1983; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1987.

